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REQUIEM FOR A REGULATOR: THE OFFICE
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION'S PERFORMANCE
DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS*
DAIN C. DONELSON" & DAVID ZARING***
We evaluate evidence reflecting the stability of our multi-regulator,
charter-competitive system of financial regulation during the financial
crisis. Specifically, we compare thrifts to banks, charter-switchers to
other thrifts and banks, and bailout recipients to non-bailout recipients
to discover if any of these institutions did poorly when compared to
their peers during the financial crisis. First, we compare publicly traded
thrifts to publicly traded banks during 2008-the critical year of the
crisis-and find that thrifts fared only marginally worse than banks, if
at all, during that year. This result modestly suggests that the multi-
regulator regime, however illogical, did not concentrate instability in a
particular industry subject to a weak regulator. Second, to evaluate the
impact of competition for charters, we compare thrift and bank
performance to those institutions that chose to switch regulators
immediately before and during the financial crisis. We find no
significant differences in returns among either institutions that
converted their federal bank charters to federal thrift charters, or
institutions that converted federal thrift charters to bank charters,
although our samples of these institutions are small. Third, we examine
the bailout propensity of these charter-switchers. Our results suggest
that although institutions switching to thrift charters were big enough to
receive bailout money from the government, they did not. Conversely,
we find that institutions switching away from thrift charters received
more bailout money than their size would suggest. Our final finding
may suggest some (possibly misplaced) dissatisfaction with the
performance of the federal thrift regulator among federal government
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officials, which may have contributed to the decision to eliminate it in
the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act passed in the wake of the crisis.
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"The conversion to a savings-bank charter better aligns the regulatory
supervision of the company with our strategic objectives." Angelo
Mozilo, CEO, Countrywide Financial Corporation, after switching
regulators from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to the
Office of Thrift Supervision in 2005.1
"By the end of 2006, Countrywide's underwriting guidelines were as
wide as they had ever been, and Countrywide was writing riskier and
riskier loans." SEC v. Mozilo, Complaint.2
INTRODUCTION
After the financial crisis decimated the financial industry, a
measure of blame was apportioned to its regulators. They were
obligated to ensure the safety and soundness of their charges after all,
and the failure of some of the largest financial institutions in the
country seemed to take them entirely by surprise. Some thought that
this failure could be ascribed to design flaws in the American
financial regulatory system, which features multiple regulators, some
1. Connie Bruck, Angelo's Ashes: The Man Who Became the Face of the Financial
Crisis, NEW YORKER, June 29, 2009, at 46, 52-53.
2. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp2l068.pdf.
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charged with very similar tasks.' These regulators competed with one
another to attract financial institutions and the supervisory fees they
generate to their various regulatory aegises.4 Moreover, financial
institutions were permitted to choose their regulator and, if they tired
of one, to switch their charter so that they could be regulated by
another.
Both Congress and the executive branch concluded that the
structure of this system contributed to the failure of regulators to
identify the weaknesses in financial institutions that devastated some
members of the industry during the crisis. They singled out one
agency in particular, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), for its
poor supervision of financial intermediaries such as American
International Group ("AIG"), the country's largest insurance
company, and Washington Mutual, the country's largest thrift, both of
which collapsed at a high cost to the government.' Both institutions
held thrift charters, placing them under the oversight of the OTS.6
3. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988) (describing the characteristics of
the dual banking system).
4. See id. at 683-84 (describing the conventional rationale for competition among
different regulators).
5. AIG was the largest such insurance failure. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG
Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 944-45 (2009) ("On February 28, 2008, American
International Group, Inc. (AIG), then the largest insurance company in the United States,
announced 2007 earnings of $6.20 billion or $2.39 per share.... Less than seven months
later, however, AIG was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be rescued by the United
States government through an $85 billion loan."). AIG held a thrift charter. Id. at 988 ("In
fact, since 1999, when AIG organized AIG Federal Savings Bank, it has been subject to
[OTS] regulation, examination, supervision, and reporting requirements."). The failure of
Washington Mutual, also chartered as a thrift, was the largest thrift or bank failure in U.S.
history. Ari Levy & Elizabeth Hester, WaMu Assets Sold to JPMorgan in Record Bank
Failure, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=aVA8ErWOAjmI.
6. At least up until now, comprehensive treatments of the thrift industry and its
regulator, outside of practice guides, have been rare. For a discussion of the structure of
the OTS following passage of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), see Michael P. Malloy, Double, Double Toil and
Trouble: Bank Regulatory Policy at Mid-Decade, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2031, 2036-38
(1995) (describing the duties and powers of the director of the OTS). The Stanford Law
and Policy Review dedicated a symposium to this question as the savings and loan
("S&L") crisis of the 1980s, which rocked the thrift industry, was beginning to abate. See
generally Charles E. Schumer & J. Brian Graham, The Unfinished Business of FIRREA, 2
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 68 (1990) (analyzing the causes of the 1980s S&L crisis and
recommending ways to improve FIRREA); M. Danny Wall, The Future of the Thrift
Industry, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 132 (1990) (describing the challenges and future
opportunities for the thrift industry). Other treatments of the thrift industry, in the
aftermath of the S&L crisis, discuss attempts by regulatory agencies to enter into binding
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Congressman Barney Frank characterized the supervision provided
by that office as worse than the policing provided by meter maids;'
two successive treasury secretaries called for its elimination during
the crisis;' and Congress, in the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act,
elected to close the institution.'
But in fact, the evidence that the OTS was the bad actor of
financial supervision during the crisis is mixed. Publicly traded thrifts
did not do significantly worse than publicly traded banks during the
crisis, if their adjusted stock returns over the course of the crisis are
compared, nor did the few institutions that went charter shopping,
either to or from the OTS, fall short by this measure. And rather than
being lax regulators, the OTS and its co-regulator, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), were criticized for being
overhasty in closing Washington Mutual and selling it, at a fire sale
price, to JPMorgan Chase. When it did make mistakes of laxity, such
as when it missed clues that pointed to systemic weaknesses in the
financial system, its record was no worse than that of other agencies
responsible for financial regulation during this period." If anything,
rather than being the poor supervisor of a motley group of risk-taking
institutions, the OTS did an average job overseeing a sleepy and
agreements with thrifts. See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial
Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 523-28 (1994) (describing the efforts of
federal regulators to require thrift holding companies to commit to capital maintenance
plans); see also Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to
Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245, 375-77 (2000)
(discussing thrift litigation in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)); Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public
Choice, 6 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 185-86 (1998) (discussing some of the litigation
against the OTS that arose from these plans); Sarah M. Graves, Note, "Winstar Wars"-
Revenge of the Thrift: A Viable Model to Right a Decade of Wrongs, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J.
361, 374-83 (2007) (analyzing the standard for damages in post-Winstar cases).
7. Brady Dennis, Born in a Previous Crisis, OTS Faces Extinction, WASH. POST,
June 18, 2009, at A15.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 8 (2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. II-
203, § 313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5413 (West Supp.
2011)).
10. In this sense, of course, the OTS was hardly unique among federal regulators,
many of whom have been indicted for their laxity and incompetence. As Richard Posner
has observed, "[m]arkets were believed to be self-regulating, so the Securities and
Exchange Commission could go to sleep. And go to sleep it did." RICHARD A. POSNER, A
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 248
(2009).
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declining part of our financial sector, comprised of firms with
relatively few assets, low risk, and low systemic significance to our
financial system.
Why, then, was the OTS singled out as a particularly bad
regulator and closed by the Dodd-Frank Act? Industry experts claim
that its disappearance was a long time in coming, as the sorts of
institutions it supervised had grown increasingly indistinct from banks
and as the sector had shrunk in importance.n Furthermore, the
reasons for a separate regulator of similar institutions often seemed to
be more a product of historical accident than sensible regulatory
design.12
If the OTS's separate regulatory ambit served a functional
purpose, it was probably because it fostered an element of
competition among regulators, much like the U.S. corporate law
system currently allows states to compete for corporate charters.
While the OTS regulated thrifts, other agencies supervised banks,
bank holding companies, credit unions, and other bank-like
institutions." All of these regulators permitted financial institutions to
change regulators if they wished, thereby taking their supervisory fees
elsewhere and directly affecting agency bottom lines. 4
Because such systems of regulatory competition are familiar in
American corporate law and increasingly ubiquitous as both business
and finance has globalized, it is worth considering whether the
existence of the OTS led to a regulatory race to the bottom or
whether it led to a race to the top. In this Article, we provide some
evidence of the qualities and deficiencies of that administrative
structure by examining the performance of the thrift industry during
the financial crisis. Comparing the thrift and banking industries, and
understanding how the regulatory environment led to legal
11. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Onetime Cop, Out of Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2010, at B.
12. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 52-56 (2009) (describing the events that gave rise to the creation
of the OTS).
13. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-302, SEC OPERATIONS:
INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 29 n.34 (2002) (describing the funding
mechanisms of the various banking regulators).
14. The budget incentives could matter more for regulators like the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the OTS than for others such as the Federal
Reserve, which makes money not only through examinations, but also in various other
capacities as a central banker.
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differences between what thrifts and banks were permitted to do with
respect to their business models, in particular, helps to answer three
questions:
(1) Did thrifts perform badly during the financial crisis relative
to banks, as measured by stock returns?
(2) Did financial institutions that switched regulators when the
housing bubble burst perform badly during the crisis, as
measured by stock returns?
(3) Were thrifts, banks, or charter-switching institutions
particularly likely to require government bailouts as the
crisis deepened?
We employ a traditional event study methodology to answer
these questions by focusing primarily on short-term stock returns
around significant news revelation events during the financial crisis.
This design provides some evidence of the merits and deficiencies of
financial regulatory competition and of the performance of a
particular regulator and industry during the financial crisis.
Specifically, we evaluate how the thrift industry fared during the 2008
calendar year crisis relative to the bank industry and to those
institutions that switched their charters from one regulator to the
other during the housing bubble.
Using raw returns, we find that, despite the criticism of the
agency, OTS-regulated thrifts in general performed only marginally
worse than banks during the financial crisis. The difference in
performance becomes statistically insignificant after returns are
adjusted for common factors known to be associated with stock
returns, including risk, book-to-market ratio, size, and momentum.
Moreover, we find that these thrifts were less risky than the banks
supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), a finding that, to be clear, may be due to the quality of the
OTS's supervision but also may be due to the size, scale, and nature
of the thrift industry. Additionally, thrifts were bailed out at the same
rate as banks, controlling for the factors identified above.
However, we find that those banks invited by the OTS to join the
thrift industry received disproportionately less bailout money after
controlling for size. Conversely, institutions that switched their
charters away from the OTS received more bailout money than would
be predicted by their size. This finding may suggest that, as a matter
of political economy, the regulators in charge of the bailouts were
1782 [Vol. 89
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suspicious of thrift switchers, the way the thrift regulator had
encouraged those switchers, or both. But as a descriptive matter, it is
worth noting that financial intermediaries did not switch their charter
between the OTS and the OCC often-we find less than ten examples
of these sorts of switchers between 2004 and 2009. This five-year
period included both the height of the housing bubble and the
subsequent onset of the financial crisis and therefore, perhaps,
provided strong incentives for aggressive financial institutions to
choose a regulator that would be receptive to their business model."
Our results modestly defend the performance of the OTS and the
multi-regulator model long embraced by the United States. The
results do not strongly indict the permissive approach to charter
switching adopted by the regulators, although they do not definitively
vindicate that approach either. 6 Finally, our results suggest that the
bailouts designed to remediate the crisis did not always go to the most
risky and relatively large financial institutions. If those large, risky
institutions had recently switched their charter to the OTS, the
government, despite permitting the switch, was unlikely to offer them
bailouts, even as it bailed out other banks and thrifts of similar size.
Despite the thrift industry's relatively adequate performance during
the financial crisis, the Treasury Department, which administered the
bailouts, may have lost patience with troubled thrifts who switched
regulators-though our relatively small sample makes definitive
conclusions difficult. This action may nonetheless be seen as
consistent with its efforts to close the office, which came to fruition in
the Dodd-Frank Act.
We begin with an overview of the traditional legal differences
between thrift charters and bank charters. We describe how those
15. It may be the case, in other words, that the institutions that switched their charter
to the OTS during the period of our study did so only because they preferred being
regulated by the OTS, rather than because they preferred the business model legislatively
required of thrifts. Because the differences between the bank and thrift charters dissipated
over time, non-thrifts could pursue that model without any legal deficiency or cost.
16. Although, it is possible that structuring some charter switches-such as
abandoning a bank holding company structure (which would remove an institution from
the purview of Federal Reserve regulation) or switching from a credit union to a different
corporate form (credit unions are mutually owned, while most banks and thrifts are stock
companies)-would be transactionally more difficult than switching from a bank to thrift
or vice versa. See Harold 0. Fried et al., The Impact of Mergers on Credit Union Service
Provision, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 367, 368 (1999) (describing the differences between
credit unions and thrifts).
17. Several studies criticize the limitations on financial intermediaries' ability to
participate in a full range of financial markets. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., Financial
2011] 1783
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differences had largely disappeared by the onset of the 2008 financial
crisis, with the exception of the Qualified Thrift Lender ("QTL") test,
which mandated thrifts participate in the housing and consumer debt
markets.1 8 We also offer a short overview of some of the criticisms
levied against the agency during the crisis.
Then, we describe our data, beginning with the construction of
four indexes: (1) publicly traded and federally regulated thrifts, (2)
publicly traded and federally regulated banks, (3) publicly traded
banks that opted to switch to a thrift charter after 2004, and (4)
publicly traded thrifts that opted to switch to a bank charter after
2004. We evaluate how these indexes performed relative to the
market during a series of relevant events throughout the financial
crisis, both by measuring equally weighted raw returns and by
measuring adjusted returns, and we find no significant difference in
adjusted returns. And although they appeared to have been prime
candidates to receive bailouts, we find that none of the charter-
switchers to the OTS received any Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP") money-a surprising outcome in light of the size of these
institutions. Conversely, the institutions that switched away from the
OTS received more TARP money than would be predicted by their
size. It is important to note that, due to a very limited sample size, our
evidence with respect to the charter-switching institutions should be
viewed as primarily descriptive in nature.
We conclude with an analysis of some of the implications of
these results. Overall, it is not clear that supervision by the OTS
contributed to the relatively poor performance of thrift institutions
during the financial crisis. After controlling for risk, there are not
significant differences between the return performance of financial
institutions that opted into the OTS regulatory regime shortly before
the financial crisis (charter-switchers). However, we do find
significant differences in the likelihood of firms receiving bailout
funds. Institutions that opted into the OTS regime were less likely to
receive bailout funds, while institutions that opted out of the OTS
regime (reverse-switchers) were more likely to receive bailout funds.
However, due to relatively small sample sizes, the results should be
Regulation and Performance: Cross-Country Evidence 4-6 (World Bank Dev. Research
Grp., Working Paper No. 2037, 1999) (finding that countries that restricted their banks
from participating in a range of activities were more likely to undergo financial crises).
18. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(m) (West 2010). Essentially, the QTL test requires that
sixty-five percent of the assets of a thrift consist of mortgage-related assets and credit card
loans. Id. Thrifts may also originate student loans. Id.
1784 [Vol. 89
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interpreted with caution. Our most cautious conclusions, then, are
that it may be that the case against the OTS was overstated, and yet it
is possible that a degree of frustration with the agency led bailout
regulators to eschew bailouts to banks that switched to become thrifts
during the financial bubble and subsequent housing crisis.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE
Many commentators and policymakers have concluded that the
multi-regulator American system of financial supervision is
complicated and ineffective.19 Because of its disaggregation, it has
been accused of being ill-suited for identifying and responding to
systemic risk.20 The combination of fee dependence on the part of the
regulators and the ability of regulated institutions to credibly threaten
to switch charters is thought by detractors to create a capture-ready
environment, in which agencies become beholden to the industries
that underwrite their budgets.21
There is, on the other hand, a broad literature suggesting that
competition among regulators can be salutary. Scholars who
19. See, e.g., GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 35 (2008), available at
http://www.deloitte.comlassets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us fsi
_bankingG30%2OFinal%20Report%2010-3-08.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
REQUIRING STRONG SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF ALL FINANCIAL FIRMS 3
(2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/requiring-strong
.supervision-reg-finfirms.pdf; David Zaring, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation,
Chapter 7: Facilitating International Regulatory Cooperation, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM 211, 212-17 (R. Glenn Hubbard et al. eds.,
2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMRReport-(5-26-09).pdf.
The complications arise in the number of federal financial regulators, of which the OTS is
but one of five. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") insures most
financial institutions, including thrifts, while the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC") regulates nationally chartered banks, and members of the Federal Reserve
System and other bank holding companies the Federal Reserve Board regulates. States
also charter their own banks and thrifts, and the National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA") oversees federally chartered credit unions.
20. Financial institutions are subject to bank runs and panics that do not always
observe distinctions between banks and bank-like institutions such as thrifts. See generally
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005) (providing an overview of how
mismanagement has lead to financial disasters over the centuries). Often, these bank runs
are countered by system-wide bailouts by the government (as was the case in the housing
crises of the 1980s and 2008) or the private sector (as was the case in the panic of 1907 and
the bailout of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998). See id. at 203-04,
209.
21. See Butler & Macey, supra note 3, at 689-90 (exploring the theory of agency
capture by the banking industry).
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subscribe to it point to state competition for corporate law charters as
an example of the benefits of this competition,22 although few have
yet argued that the regulation of financial institutions enjoys similar
benefits.23 Charter competition in corporate law is thought to offer an
exit to corporations saddled with onerous legal rules and to
encourage states to develop efficient levels of oversight. In this view,
the competition for laws is supposed to offer the benefits that
competition offers in other markets: innovation, attention to the
needs of the consumer of the product, efficiency gains, and the like.
The director of the OTS, John Reich, suggested another benefit
to disaggregated regulation by arguing that multiple agencies create
good regulation from cooperation, as opposed to competition, with
something of a bow to the wisdom of crowds and Condorcet's jury
theorem.24 "We make each other better agencies," he has claimed.25
"It's always better when there are more people at the policymaking
table than a consolidation situation where one person, one agency
director, is in charge without input from other agency heads."26 In this
view, the benefits of disaggregated regulation lie in regulation by
committee, with all the advantages that such considered decision-
making processes offer.27
22. See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 665 (arguing that there is a general market for laws that is
influenced by political and economic incentives); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory
Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL'Y 212, 212-31 (2005) (arguing for regulatory competition); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,
254-58 (1977) (describing how Delaware corporation law has changed because of
competition among the states for charters).
23. Financial regulators are concerned with the safety and soundness of the
institutions they regulate (and think about the possibility that they must spend taxpayer
dollars on a bailout of failed financial institutions), reflecting a somewhat broader view of
the charter's purpose than is the case for state corporate law, which only authorizes
corporations to maximize shareholder value and minimize agency costs.
24. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS,
ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 125, 166 (2004).
25. Cheyenne Hopkins, Wamu Vanishes, So May OTS and the Thrift Charter, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Reich's view is a useful corrective to those considering how closely financial
regulation approximates true competition for corporate charters. See, e.g., Kenneth E.
Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV.
1, 1-50 (1978). While financial regulators do take charters away from one another, they
also coordinate policy. We note this, but we leave it aside for much of what follows. We
presume that if these regulators agree to supervise financial institutions identically, there
should be no difference in the performance of the agencies during the crisis; if they agree
1786 [Vol. 89
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The competition for, or perhaps cooperation over, charters has
been an evolving feature of American financial regulation. During the
last forty years, charter competition was facilitated by the willingness
of the financial regulators to permit charter switches, as, for example,
the OTS's how-to regulations demonstrate? The agency devoted an
entire chapter in its handbook, Conversion of Bank or Credit Union
to a Federal Charter, to facilitate the process of switching charters.29
Invitations to switch charters were not uncommon, and they were
often accepted, sometimes to the OTS's detriment. From 1998 to
2008, the OTS lost a net forty-five institutions as more thrifts
converted to banks than vice versa.3 0 Some of these financial
institutions left the federal system altogether; between 2000 and 2008,
at least thirty gave up their federal charters for state charters.
The OTS, to be sure, was not simply a charter-switching
opportunity; for financial institutions to be regulated by it, they had
to-at least to a degree-subscribe to its mission. The OTS required
(as Congress demanded) that financial institutions chartered under its
auspices devote sixty-five percent of their loans to home and
consumer finance.32 The concentration of thrift assets in home loans
that resulted from this lending requirement appeared to be disastrous
to supervise these institutions differently (or if congressional requirements contribute to
differential supervision), then a competition-like regime would result. Thus, we assume
that differences in regulatory supervision would be observed by market participants and
that stock returns during the financial crisis would reflect such observed regulatory
differences.
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.24(f) (2010).
29. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 430 (2001),
available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/425023.pdf.
30. Jessica Holzer, U.S. Thrift Charter May Be Hard to Kill, WALL ST. J., June 25,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090625-706073.html.
31. Binyamin Appelbaum, By Switching Their Charters, Banks Skirt Supervision,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2009, at Al.
32. Many commentators have criticized what they see as a misguided national housing
policy. They observe that the United States has tried, through a variety of mechanisms-
including the home ownership tax credit, the creation of government-sponsored
enterprises to pool mortgages, and the creation of a separate regulator dedicated to
financial institutions committed to home lending-to bolster home ownership beyond
where it would lie in a less regulated market, with, they argue, deleterious effects. See, e.g.,
Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACIVITY, Fall 2003, at 299, 341 (concluding, based on an analysis of
housing data, that there was evidence of a housing bubble in the early 2000s); Eric Posner,
Paying Loan Servicers to Modify Loans, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 4, 2009, 5:01
PM), http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_02_01-2009_02_07.shtml#1233788467
(discussing loan modification services in the aftermath of the collapse of the housing
bubble).
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for thrifts during the financial crisis, which began after the collapse of
a housing bubble. "[F]ive of the seven biggest [financial institution]
failures [in 2007 and 2008] were OTS-regulated thrifts."33 Another
bank that had switched its charter in 2005 to become a thrift,
Countrywide Financial Corporation, avoided failure only because of
an emergency merger with Bank of America, which thereafter
required its own large bailout to survive." And the largest bailout
during the crisis-that of AIG, an insurance company whose financial
products unit held a thrift charter-was also linked to the OTS.5
The financial crisis provides an opportunity to evaluate the
merits of the choose-your-regulator system that was in place
throughout the period, and basing such an inquiry on the housing-
centric thrift industry offers a look at how that regulatory regime
performed.
II. LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE THRIFT REGULATORY REGIME
Thrifts began as unique financial institutions with their own
regulator, their own charter, and, critically, their own unique lending
requirements. But by the last financial crisis, the differences between
thrift and bank regulation had largely disappeared. The result was
that while thrifts and banks had operated in different markets for
many years, by the turn of the century those differences had eroded,
and financial institutions therefore had a largely, but not entirely,
untrammeled choice between regulators, one that would not force
them to choose a different business if they switched.
At first, many thrifts were organized mutually rather than as
stock companies, and all were committed to home lending. 6 All
33. Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, Future Solutions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 19
(2009) (prepared statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. and Helen M. England
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1367977.
34. Gregory J. Wilcox, Valley Lender Is Key Mortgage Meltdown Culprit: Former
Countrywide Tops List for Making Risky, Subprime Home Loans, DAILY NEWS (L.A.),
May 9, 2009, at Al (stating that "top subprime lenders," of whom Countrywide was the
most egregious example, "were owned or backed by giant banks now collecting billions of
dollars in federal bailout money").
35. See supra note 5.
36. E.g., PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 3.02 (2d ed. 2003).
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thrifts were chartered at the state level.37 The Great Depression
caused a number of thrift failures, leading to a partial federalization
of thrift oversight.38 Amid a number of other New Deal-era reforms
of financial regulation, Congress created the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("FHLBB") to supervise thrifts that elected to be
chartered at the federal level." FHLBB-chartered thrifts were also
required to participate in an FDIC-like insurance fund that was
administered for many years by the FHLBB and eventually ceded to
the FDIC after the 1980s savings and loan ("S&L") crisis.40 And they
were subject to a number of restrictions on the type of banking in
which they could participate, including the taking of demand deposits
and the making of commercial loans.4 1 Finally, these thrifts had to
meet the QTL test, which required them to offer home mortgages or
other forms of consumer credit.42
Thrift regulation evolved over the post-Depression years to offer
financial institutions some benefits that the bank charter could not,
including unlimited interstate branching, strong federal regulatory
preemption, relatively relaxed holding company oversight, and, for
some fortunate non-financial institutions and insurance companies,
the so-called unitary thrift charter ("UTC").4 3 The UTC allowed
parent companies to run single thrifts without meeting any of the
usual thrift holding company requirements. Next, we briefly review
37. E.g., DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995, at 69-74
(2004).
38. Id. at 69.
39. John J. McDonald, Jr., Similarities Between the Savings & Loan Crisis and Today's
Current Financial Crisis: What the Past Can Tell Us About the Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J.
470,471 (2009).
40. The crisis led to the failure of a huge number of thrifts, and it resulted in proposed
legislation to abolish the thrift regulator-instead it was reformed and renamed, as the
OTS. For a discussion of the special bankruptcy powers of federal regulators, see
Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts,
27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 367-68 (1990) (focusing on the constitutionality of resolution
authority); David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 109-13 (2010). For an
account that focuses on the S&L crisis, see generally Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law
Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469 (1992) (providing a synthesis of the reasons
for bank insolvency laws).
41. For a brief discussion of these limitations, see Robert F. Weber, New Governance,
Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 840 (2010).
42. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the QTL
test).
43. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the way the UTC charter
worked).
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the differences between thrifts and banks and describe the evolution
of each of them.
Banking Services: Thrifts engaged in different, or at least
radically more limited, banking than did banks before the
deregulation enacted by the 1982 Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act." That statute-passed in part to help thrifts out of
the emerging S&L crisis by permitting them to engage in new lines of
business-removed the limitations on the taking of demand deposits
and the making of commercial loans.4 5 After 1982, thrifts could offer
almost any of the services that banks could, provided they met the
QTL test.
Branching: For many years, state law prohibited most banks
from branching across state lines.46 Federally chartered thrifts,
however, were always entitled to branch, and state anti-branching
laws were preempted by the Depression-era statute governing
federally chartered thrifts, the Home Owners' Loan Act ("HOLA"). 4 7
During this period, and especially after 1982, financial institutions
interested in building a national market of retail depositors were
incentivized to choose thrift charters, which permitted interstate
branching, over bank charters, which were subject to state anti-
branching laws in the vast majority of states.4
Preemption: The option to branch across state lines was a
function of the strong federal preemption powers contained in the
HOLA and, less obviously, contained in the statutes authorizing
issuance of a federal bank charter.49  The OTS promulgated
44. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 22, and 42 U.S.C.).
45. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant
Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 115 n.115 (2009).
46. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from
Bank Branch Deregulation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 639, 642 (1996).
47. Home Owners' Loan Act, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (2006)).
48. See Joyce A. Hughes, Bank and Thrift Intrastate Branching, 11 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 335, 342 (1992).
49. The difference between the HOLA and the National Banking Act, as a matter of
preemption doctrine, is that the former arguably provided for "field" preemption, while
the latter provided for "conflict" preemption. The field preemption view was first stated in
California v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 318 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
The Supreme Court has not explicitly endorsed field preemption, but it has not yet
permitted a state effort to regulate a federal thrift to survive. In cases such as Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161 (1982) (finding a
California due-on-sale regulation to be preempted by federal regulation of thrifts and
noting that HOLA contains "broad language" with no express limits on the authority of
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regulations providing for "the plenary and exclusive authority of the
[OTS] to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal savings
associations . . . . This exercise of the Office's authority is
preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the
operations of a Federal savings association." 0 As one influential
district court opinion put it, "[n]ot only does the Act of Congress
which authorizes the creation, operation and supervision of federal
savings and loan associations . . . embrace the entire field, but the
comprehensive rules and regulations adopted by the Board clearly
meet the test of covering the subject matter of the statute."" Courts,
including the Supreme Court, regularly precluded state regulators
from interfering with the lending practices of federally chartered
thrifts.52 Thrifts accordingly enjoyed less state supervision than did
federally chartered banks, which were subject to state regulation
wherever federal regulation did not directly conflict.
Thrift Holding Companies and the UTC: Finally, thrift holding
companies were subject to less robust federal supervision than were
bank holding companies.53 The apogee of this difference arose in the
so-called UTC, which provided that holding companies owning a
single thrift were exempt from even the minimal requirements of
thrift holding company supervision.5 4 The passage of a series of
otherwise technical reforms in 1996 opened a window for non-thrifts
and non-banks to take advantage of the UTC. During this period, a
number of large conglomerates-such as insurance companies,
the FHLBB "to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans"), the Court
implied that the preemption regime of the HOLA was, at the least, very broad.
50. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2010).
51. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. at 318.
52. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 159 (holding that federal law
preempted California state regulations on federal savings and loans).
53. Thrift holding companies were not subject to the same activities restrictions as
bank holding companies. A thrift could affiliate with non-financial companies, provided
their business did not threaten the thrift's safety and soundness. For a discussion of the
unitary thrift charter, see James M. Cain & John J. Fahey, Banks and Insurance
Companies-Together in the New Millennium, 55 BuS. LAw. 1409, 1411 (2000); Ira L.
Tannenbaum, The Unitary Thrift Holding Company and the Thrift Charter After the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 20, 1999, at 1, 11-12.
54. See Tannenbaum, supra note 53, at 11-12.
55. For a discussion of this process, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88
MINN. L. REV. 518, 603-04 (2004); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation
of Banking and Commerce, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 1539, 1579 n.234, 1584-85 & nn.263-65
(2007).
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investment banks, auto companies, and even exotic firms such as a
department store and a casket manufacturer-did so.s"
The End of the Unique Attributes of the Thrift Charter: Over the
course of the last twenty years, however, the unique advantages and
restrictions of the thrift charter were either competed away by other
banking regulators or taken away by Congress."
First, in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994, Congress amended the limitations on
interstate branching by banks, making such branching essentially as
easy as branching via thrifts."
Second, the OCC adopted a wide-ranging preemption regime-
one that extended the old conflict preemption rules to something that
looked very much like the field preemption of state regulation of
banks adopted by the OTS.59 In Watters v. Wachovia Bank,' the
Supreme Court deferred to the OCC's broad new preemption
regulations, holding that the OCC's regulations preempted state
licensing and registration requirements for operation subsidiaries of
OCC-chartered banks." Accordingly, although the OTS touted the
strong preemption regime offered by the thrift charter until its end,
the preemption differences had become increasingly hard for outside
observers to perceive.62
56. See Schiltz, supra note 55, at 603-04 (describing a surge of companies buying
thrifts after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed in 1999).
57. This convergence may have been prompted by the S&L crisis of the 1980s, which
soured some influential legislators on the value of the federal thrift charter. Indeed, the
thrift charter survived a 1990s effort to eliminate it that was led by the then chairman of
the House Financial Services Committee, Jim Leach. Jacqueline Fitzgerald, Budget Office
Report: No Longer Need a Separate Thrift Industry, Study Says, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 17,
1997, http://articles.chicagotribune.com1997-06-17/business/9706170181_1_separate-thrift-
industry-federal-thrift-charter-chairman-jim-leach ("The bill, offered by committee
Chairman Jim Leach (R-lowa), would abolish the federal thrift charter and treat state-
chartered thrifts, or savings and loans, as banks.").
58. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, § 201(a), 108 Stat. 2338, 2368 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)
(2006)).
59. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2010).
60. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
61. Id. at 21. But see Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 (2009)
(finding that the enforcement of state fair lending laws was not preempted by OCC
regulations).
62. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream,
26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 167-69 (2009) (discussing the race to the bottom in which the
OTS matched the OCC's changes). See generally OFFICE OF THRiFT SUPERVISION,
ANNUAL REPORT: SUPERVISING THROUGH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS (2008), available at
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Third, although it never equalized bank and thrift holding
company supervision entirely, Congress took away the window during
which non-financial companies could take control of single thrifts. It
closed the UTC loophole via the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999,63
denying holding companies the right to purchase or operate thrifts
without first converting to thrift holding companies.' Existing unitary
thrifts were grandfathered in and were thus permitted to retain their
single thrifts.65
Fourth, thrifts were permitted in 1982 to do much of the work of
banks, including taking demand deposits and making commercial
loans.66
Conclusion: By 2005, the remaining value of the thrift charter lay
largely in the relationship between the regulator and any financial
institution willing to commit to the home and consumer loan model
that the QTL test required of the thrifts. Banks and thrifts had the
same capital requirements, the same community lending
requirements, and, as we have observed, the four differences between
the bank and thrift charters that the OTS and outside observers had
claimed as the basis for its distinctiveness had largely disappeared.
Any institution that met the QTL test, in other words, could
choose to be regulated by the OTS or by the OCC. The OTS's
distinctiveness to these institutions may have lain in its expertise in
evaluating housing loans, but it could also have been the case that the
OTS, the smallest of the financial regulators and dependent, like all
of them, on fees from charter holders, was regulating with a
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/482008.pdf (discussing the OTS's supervision during the
financial crisis).
63. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and
15 U.S.C.).
64. § 401, 113 Stat. at 1435 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(9) (2006)). As a political
matter, this meant that much of the political support for the continued existence of the
thrift charter came from these alternative institutions, which valued their ability to connect
with retail depositors through their thrift subsidiaries.
65. Id.
66. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Influence of Enhanced Thrift Institution Powers on
Commercial Bank Market Expansion, 67 N.C. L. REv. 795, 796 (1989) ("Following the
enactment of the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, all
federally insured thrift institutions (state and federally chartered) may offer NOW
accounts-the functional equivalent of interest-bearing checking accounts-to consumer
customers. These acts also authorized federally chartered thrift institutions to devote a
portion of their assets to loans other than home mortgage loans, including nonresidential
real estate loans, nonmortgage consumer loans, and commercial loans, and to offer non-
interest bearing checking accounts to commercial loan customers.").
2011] 1793
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
particularly light touch. Indeed, observers concluded that the agency
had grown especially close to the financial industry.67
Plenty of anecdotal reasons suggested that regulatory capture
was the only thing distinguishing the OTS's supervision from bank
supervision. For example, when the troubled financial institution
Countrywide considered trading in its bank charter for a thrift
charter, the OTS lobbied Countrywide to make the switch.68 "The
OTS is a little more relaxed," one thrift executive told a trade
publication, and a bank lobbyist suggested that, when it comes to
home mortgages, "[t]he other agencies don't understand these
products as well, so they are less comfortable leaving some of the
management issues to the judgment of the examiner in the field."'
Why this sort of apparent distinctiveness was a good thing remains
unclear. The thrift regulator " 'lived through the calls for the
elimination of OTS' for 'pretty much all 20 years of OTS's
existence.' "Io Those calls reached an apogee during the 2008 financial
crisis, when the Obama administration concluded that a separate
thrift regulator destabilized the financial system and proposed
eliminating the charter. "Eliminating the thrift charter is one of the
most important steps toward a more prudent, efficient financial
regulatory system," the government announced in materials
accompanying proposed financial reform legislation that it sent to
Capitol Hill." Congressman Barney Frank said in 2009, "We are
67. See, e.g., Senator Ted Kaufman, Captive Regulators Contributed to Oil and
Financial Disasters, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2010, 6:02 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/sen-ted-kaufman/captive-regulators-contri b_661352.html ("OTS was
captured to such a great degree that it lobbied other regulators to weaken nontraditional
mortgage regulation.").
68. Bruck, supra note 1, at 53.
69. Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 10, 2006, at 1.
70. Dennis, supra note 7. Indeed, this sort of criticism preceded the creation of the
agency. The OTS was created out of the ashes of a predecessor agency, the FHLBB, that
had overseen the last housing crisis during the S&L collapse of the 1980s. See Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 401-
405, 103 Stat. 183, 354-63 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)) (abolishing the FHLBB
and creating the OTS); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA,
and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the
Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1136 (1993) ("[T]he
FHLBB was viewed as a failed administrative agency, corrupt at worst and at best riddled
with conflicts of interest and wholly captured by the industry it was supposed to regulate.
For this reason the FHLBB was abolished and its functions were divided among the FDIC
and two newly created entities, the Resolution Trust Corporation and the OTS.").
71. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 19, at 3.
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going to abolish, I hope, the Office of Thrift Supervision. . . . AIG
and some others that were theoretically regulated by the OTS, that
was like being regulated by the meter maid."7 2 Frank's hopes were
eventually realized in the Dodd-Frank Act, which abolished the
OTS.73
In our view, the evolving nature of thrift supervision at the
federal level offers an opportunity to evaluate the consequences of
the multi-regulator model during a crisis and to evaluate the
consequences of regulator-shopping. We do not assume that the
ability to switch charters is necessarily bad, of course, but its merits
are less obvious than they may be in corporate law.74
We accordingly test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 ("Hi"): Publicly traded financial institutions that
changed their regulator to the OTS during and after the
housing bubble had lower stock returns than did publicly traded
institutions that did not, controlling for other variables during
the crisis.
Hypothesis 2 ("H2"): Financial institutions that were
encouraged by their charter to participate in home lending (i.e.,
thrifts) had lower stock returns during the financial crisis.
Hypothesis 3 ("H"): Financial institutions that changed their
regulator to the OTS during and after the housing bubble were
more likely to receive bailouts during the financial crisis.
Hypothesis 4 ("H4"): Financial institutions that changed their
regulator from the OTS during and after the housing bubble
were more likely to receive bailouts during the financial crisis.
Hypothesis 5 ("H5"): Financial institutions that were
encouraged by their charter to participate in home lending (i.e.,
thrifts) were more likely to receive bailouts during the financial
crisis.
72. Dennis, supra note 7.
73. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5413 (West Supp.
2011)).
74. See Butler & Macey, supra note 3, at 686-88 (describing the difficulties of
switching charters).
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III. EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Introduction
To test our hypotheses, we construct four non-overlapping
indexes of federally regulated financial institutions. The first index
consists of publicly traded banks regulated by the OCC; the second
index consists of publicly traded thrifts; the third index consists of
publicly traded, OCC-chartered institutions that switched their
charter to the OTS after 2004; and the fourth index consists of
publicly traded financial institutions that switched their charter from
the OTS after 2004. By looking at these four indexes, we determine
how OTS-regulated institutions fared when compared to their OCC-
regulated counterparts, expecting differences either because of the
QTL requirements (the requirement that thrifts participate more
actively in the housing lending market than banks) or because of a
different quality of oversight.
The separation of thrifts that recently opted into the OTS
regulatory system is designed to isolate the regulatory effects to the
greatest extent possible because all thrifts are subject to the same
QTL requirements, and they are thus likely to have relatively similar
business models. On the other hand, the interpretation of results for
the institutions that switched from the OTS is more ambiguous
because these institutions could have been seeking either a new
regulator or seeking to avoid the QTL requirements.
As suggested earlier, we found that the thrift industry performed
worse than the bank industry, but when returns were adjusted by the
standard four-factor model utilized in finance studies, the difference
disappeared." Although some of the individual developments of the
crisis resulted in significantly different returns for banks and thrifts,
our indexes performed similarly overall. Our small number of
charter-switchers also performed similarly, although those that
switched to the OTS in the last five years had comparatively high risk
profiles. These switchers received surprisingly different levels of
bailout funds than did the banks or thrifts. We discuss our findings in
more detail below.
75. The four factors are beta (systematic risk), size, book-to-market ratio, and
momentum. E.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J.
FIN. 57, 61 (1997).
76. In addition to the event studies described, we investigated whether the change
from one regulator to another affected the stock price of our switchers. Identifying the
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B. Data
We create our bank and thrift indexes from a list of publicly
traded companies taken from the Center for Research in Security
Prices ("CRSP") 77 as of December 31, 2004, and we narrow this list to
financial institutions using standard industrial classification ("SIC")
codes, which roughly identify banks, thrifts, and various other
financial institutions.7 8 We further narrow this list to holders of
federal OTS charters by comparing the included publicly traded
institutions to those listed on the FDIC's institution directory,
allowing us to identify the charter held by the thrift as of December
31, 2004, and, if any, the holding company of the institution at that
time.
We compare the list of remaining financial institutions to the
New York Federal Reserve's banking research database that
identifies OCC charter holders and links publicly traded bank and
bank holding companies to their identifiers in CRSP.so We also obtain
data on which financial institutions received bailout money from the
federal government via ProPublica's TARP database.8 1  After
matching to CRSP, we identify 359 publicly traded banks and bank
holding companies as of July 2007. By the end of the sample period,
this number falls to 319 due to mergers, acquisitions, and other types
of delisting.
To find the institutions that switched their charters, we consult
the institution's history as provided in the FDIC database and identify
all companies that had a thrift charter in a year-end report that had a
point at which the market would learn of the switch was not easy (applications to switch
were not announced, nor did the press cover such applications, and even the 8-K record
was ambiguous), but the stock prices for the switching institutions at the date of the switch
suggested neither an embrace nor a rejection of the decision.
77. Wharton Research Data Services, THE WHARTON SCH. OF THE UNIV. OF PA.,
http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ (last visited May 4, 2011).
78. Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code
List, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last visited
May 4, 2011). The requirement for all institutions to have publicly listed common stock at
the end of 2004 also eliminates potentially confounding effects due to abnormal returns
from initial public offerings. See, e.g., Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues
Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 23-52 (1995) (discussing the implications of this approach).
79. Institution Directory, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/IDASP/
(last visited May 4, 2011).
80. Banking Research Datasets, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www
.newyorkfed.org/researchlbankingresearch/datasets.html (last visited May 4, 2011).
81. Eye on the Bailout: Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://bailout.propublica
.org/list/index (last visited May 4, 2011).
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non-thrift charter in a previous report (or vice versa). 82 Thus, through
the FDIC's institutional history data, we identify all companies that
switched their charters. This group consists of five institutions that
switched charters to become thrifts as of July 2007, including a pair of
relatively large ones, BB&T and Countrywide.83 By the end of the
sample period, the collection is reduced to four firms due to
Countrywide's acquisition by Bank of America. We find only two
firms with sufficient stock return data that switched away from the
OTS.
Finally, we develop an index of sixty thrifts, current as of July
2007, by identifying thrift listings in Yahoo! Finance' and Google
Finance" and subsequently comparing that index to the FDIC's 2004
institutional directory-a process that revealed which of the publicly
traded thrifts listed on both websites were federally chartered as of
2004.86 By the end of the sample period, this group falls to fifty-six.
We utilize this sample to form the four aforementioned indexes
of financial institutions during the subprime crisis period. The four
indexes consist of (1) financial institutions that switched from a bank
charter to a federal thrift charter (Charter-Switchers); (2) financial
institutions that switched from a thrift charter to a bank charter
(Reverse-Switchers); (3) all other federal thrift-chartered institutions
(Other Thrifts); and (4) all other federally chartered banks (Banks).
To provide a baseline for the financial crisis timeline, Figure 1
provides the cumulative stock returns for Other Thrifts (labeled
"Thrifts" in the figure) and Banks between March and December
2008. We do not include Charter-Switchers or Reverse-Switchers due
to the noisy nature (high variance) of their returns, attributable to the
small number of firms in each group. Overall, the performance of
Other Thrifts was marginally worse than that of Banks, as is
evidenced by a one-sided p-value of 0.081. However, the economic
difference is relatively large, with a difference in returns over the
period of roughly twenty percentage points. The lack of strong
statistical significance, however, indicates that the returns series is
relatively noisy and that the difference in returns could be due to
82. Institution Directory, supra note 79.
83. One other financial institution converted to a thrift charter but delisted
simultaneously with its conversion, and we thus exclude this firm from our tests.
84. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited May 4, 2011).
85. GOOGLE FINANCE, http://www.google.com/finance (last visited May 4, 2011).
86. We excluded credit unions that switched over to thrift charters from our list.
Credit unions are not publicly traded, so they are not amenable to an event study analysis.
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chance. We explore this more fully below by utilizing shorter-window
returns and examining returns adjusted for other factors known to be
associated with stock returns.
Figure 1: Cumulative Raw Returns for Thrifts and Banks"
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C. Event Study
We define major events based on a timeline developed by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York." This timeline includes major
market events, government responses, and Federal Reserve monetary
policy changes.89 Many of these events are very close in time or
overlap with each other, illustrating the difficulty with conducting a
clean event study for the financial crisis.o We distinguish major
87. This figure charts the cumulative raw returns for Banks and Other Thrifts (labeled
"Thrift" in the figure) over the financial crisis period, March to December 2008.
88. Timelines of Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global-economy/policy
responses.html (last visited May 4, 2011).
89. Id.
90. The timeline includes more than one hundred discrete events, many of which
occurred within three days of one another, thereby presenting challenges for the
utilization of the traditional three-day window for return measurement around major
events. Id.
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events based on the expected investor perception of the news on
thrifts. Thus, we delineate those events with negative news for thrifts
(and thus negative expected returns) from those events for which the
news for thrifts is either positive or ambiguous. Most of these
negative news events would also have negative implications for banks,
but our study is designed to examine how the different charters fared
during the financial crisis, so we utilize the Banks index return
primarily as a benchmark for the Charter-Switchers and Other
Thrifts.
While the Federal Reserve timeline of the subprime crisis
includes several precursor events, starting in June 2007, we begin our
analysis with the Bear Stearns liquidity crisis in March 2008, which led
to the first major financial institution failure. We consider this the
first significant negative event due to its implications regarding the
marketability of subprime-related assets, in which Bear Stearns and
many thrifts were heavily invested; it is also offered by many as the
starting bell for the crisis. Other negative events potentially affecting
thrifts include Bank of America's purchase of Countrywide (a thrift)
in June 2008, which essentially amounted to a thrift failure based on
subprime lending; an immense quarterly loss by Lehman Brothers in
June 2008; the IndyMac Mortgage Services (a thrift) failure and
subsequent takeover in July 2008; the closure of Washington Mutual
and the failure of its initial bailout plan in the House of
Representatives in September 2008; and the release of the Term
Asset-Backed Loan Facility ("TALF") details, which precluded
financial institutions from taking advantage of central bank liquidity
for housing-related assets, followed by the subsequent downgrade of
large banks by Standard & Poor's in December 2008.
Positive or ambiguous events include the announcement that
Bear Stearns would receive a higher acquisition price than JP Morgan
Chase's original offer in March 2008; a series of events including the
federal takeovers of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, and the short-selling ban on financial
institutions' stock in September 2008 (which, we think, impacted
thrifts in both positive and negative ways, making the cumulative
event an ambiguous one); the Wells Fargo counteroffer and eventual
purchase approval of Wachovia Bank in October 2008; and the
agreed-upon capital injections, increase in FDIC insurance, and
update of the Tier 1 capital definition in October 2008.
Table 1 summarizes the events categorized above as well as the
raw returns around these events. Return measurement periods
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include the three-day window, centered on the first trading day on
which the relevant news was available, 9' unless events cannot be
cleanly separated.' When events cannot be cleanly separated in such
three-day windows, we group events into slightly longer windows and
cumulate returns over these longer periods. All index returns for
Charter-Switchers, Other Thrifts, and Banks are also equal-
weighted. 3
As shown in Table 1, Charter-Switchers and Reverse-Switchers
have lower returns than Banks and Other Thrifts, coincident with five
of the six negative news events (Charter-Switchers have lower returns
for all six events). Over the twenty trading days coincident with the
negative news events, Charter-Switchers have cumulative raw returns
of -37.2%, compared to -37.8% for Reverse-Switchers, -13.0% for
Other Thrifts, and -12.0% for Banks. Thus, it appears that the stocks
of Charter-Switchers and Reverse-Switchers were hit much harder by
the negative news related to the subprime crisis than either Other
Thrifts or Banks. Around the positive or ambiguous events, Charter-
Switchers have cumulative returns of 9.2%, compared to 4.2% for
Reverse-Switchers, -0.7% for Other Thrifts, and 6.9% for Banks.
Thus, the lower returns experienced by Charter-Switchers and
Reverse-Switchers over the negative news events cannot be attributed
simply to lower returns overall during the subprime crisis. However,
these returns do not control for risk and other factors known to be
correlated with stock returns. We further explore this outcome next.
91. Prior studies used similar approaches to examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on firms. See generally Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US
Companies Cross-Listed in the US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007) (utilizing fourteen event
windows); Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
44 J. Acr. & ECON. 74 (2007) (investigating stock price reactions to Sarbanes-Oxley
events).
92. The use of such three-day windows is common in the accounting and finance
literatures because prices both lead and lag major news events. See William H. Beaver,
Perspectives on Recent Capital Market Research, 77 Acr. REV. 453, 457, 460 (2002). For
example, a study that examined a major financial crisis in 1987, brought about by
substantial write-offs of debt from lesser-developed countries, utilized such three-day
windows. John A. Elliott et al., The Evaluation by the Financial Markets of Changes in
Bank Loan Loss Reserve Levels, 66 Accr. REV. 847, 847, 854-55 (1991).
93. We utilize CRSP returns, including delisting returns where available. When a
delisting return is not available and a firm delists for performance-related reasons,
delisting returns of -30% are assumed for NYSE/AMEX firms. Tyler Shumway, The
Delisting Bias in CRSP Data, 52 J. FIN. 327, 331, 336 (1997). Delisting returns of -55% are
used for NASDAQ firms. Tyler Shumway & Vincent A. Warther, The Delisting Bias in
CRSP's Nasdaq Data and Its Implications for the Size Effect, 54 J. FIN. 2361, 2361-62
(1999).
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Table 1: Event Dates and Cumulative Raw Returns94
Bear Stearns
"bank run'"
Mar. 12-
Mar. 14 3 4.9% -6.7% -0.9% -1.5%
Countrywide sale June 7-
to Bank of 3 67.3 -7.5 -2.0%
America
Lehman 20 loss June 13
of $2.8B June 17 -2.3% -0.6 1
IndyMac July 10- 6% -3.9%
takeover July 14
Wash. Mutual
closure:
Citi/Wachovia Sept. 24- 5 -2.6% -1.9% -2.4%o -1.7%odiscussions; Sept. 30
Bailout voted
down
TALF details
released; Dec. 19-reesd e.1- 3 -12.0% -9.6% -0.8% -1.9%Large banks Dec. 23
down raded
Total negative 20 -37.2% 37.8% -13.00 -12.0%
Bear Sterns price Mar. 20 8.2 8.6% 3.1% 4.4%
increase Mar. 25 3
Freddie/Fannie
takeover;
Lehman Sept.5 200% 9.1% 17/bankruptcy; Sept. 22
Short sales
banned
Wells Fargo
acquires Oct. 2
Wachovia; Oct. 8 -22.0% -30.4% -8.0% -7.9%
House passes
revised plan
94. This Table provides the event date window details from the Federal Reserve
timeline. the number of trading days during the period (per CRSP), and the raw
cumulative returns for each index of financial institutions (Charter-Switchers, Reverse-
Switchers, Other Thrifts, and Banks). Returns are equal-weighted for each financial
institution index.
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Capital injections
agreed upon;
FDIC insurance Oct. 14- 4 1.0% 6.0% 2.4% 1.4%
increase; Oct. 17
Tier 1 capital
definition
Total positive/ 27 9.2% 4.2% -0.7% 6.9%
ambiguous I I I
One advantage of using relatively short-window returns periods
is that the specification of the return model is less important because
short-window returns are expected to be near zero." However, we
also investigate potential differences in risk by estimating a capital
asset pricing model ("CAPM") regression for the index returns of
Charter-Switchers, Reverse-Switchers, Other Thrifts, and Banks:
Model 1: Index Return,- RF, = o8, +,(Market Return,- RF,)+ e,
This model is estimated utilizing 168 trading days, spanning July 2007
to February 2008. We select this timeframe because it ends
approximately two weeks prior to the first major event we study, but
it also contains some indications of the impending subprime
problem.96
For our purposes, the CAPM is convenient because it yields one
summary measure of exposure to market risk, the f, coefficient, that
is easily comparable across the four indexes. However, because the
CAPM does not explain stock returns well, 7 we utilize the CAPM
results only for this simple measure of risk, and we instead estimate
the four-factor model common in the finance literature to adjust stock
returns.98
Table 2 presents results from estimates of Model 1. The fl,
coefficients are 1.541 for Charter-Switchers, 1.424 for Reverse-
Switchers, 0.475 for Other Thrifts, and 0.775 for Banks. In other
words, the returns of Banks were similar to the market index return
(as indicated by a coefficient relatively close to one), while Charter-
95. See Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral
Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 283 (1998).
96. See Timelines of Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, supra note 88.
97. E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock
Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 427 (1992).
98. As noted earlier, the four factors are beta (systematic risk), size, book-to-market
ratio, and momentum. E.g., Carhart, supra note 75, at 61. These factors explain a
significant amount of the variation in stock return patterns. See id.
2011] 1803
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Switchers and Reverse-Switchers had relatively higher risk (as
indicated by a coefficient significantly greater than one), and Other
Thrifts had relatively lower risk (as indicated by a coefficient
significantly lower than one). Notably, even though Charter-
Switchers and Other Thrifts were both subject to the QTL test, the
estimate of systematic risk for the Charter-Switchers is more than
three times that of Other Thrifts.
The broad market index may not be an ideal benchmark because
numerous other factors are also correlated with stock returns. Thus,
we also estimate a four-factor model common in the finance
literature:
Model 2: Index Return, - RF, = , + fl,(Market Return, - R,) +
#,2SMB +/PHML +/,UMD +E,
Results from estimating Model 2 are similar in magnitude to those of
Model 1 with respect to the P, coefficient: 1.402 for Charter-Switchers,
1.333 for Reverse-Switchers, 0.430 for Other Thrifts, and 0.713 for
Banks. Again, this suggests that Charter-Switchers and Reverse-
Switchers were substantially riskier than Banks, while Other Thrifts
were less risky. Other factor loadings are presented in Table 2;
however, the explanatory power (the amount of variation in returns
explained by the relevant factors, as measured by the adjusted r-
squared) of Model 2 is much higher than that of Model 1. For
example, Model 2 has an adjusted r-squared of 0.774 versus 0.527 for
Model 1. We therefore utilize the Model 2 results to measure
abnormal returns, as this model appears to capture the relevance of
economic news more completely than market returns.
1804 [Vol. 89
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Table 2: Asset Pricing Models"
Intercept -0.001(0.77)
-0.002**
(1.98)
-0.001*
(1.82)
1805
-0.001
(1.09)
Market 1.541*** 1.424*** 0.475*** 0.775***
Return (13.69) (16.15) (11.05) (17.59)
Adjusted R 0.527 0.609 0.420 0.649
n 168 168 168 168
sub filtr om Model2 (Four-Fdlar Modcl
Char Iter- Ro CVer 10e Other
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000Intercept (0.83) 1.39 0.71 1.26)
Market 1.402*** 1.333** 0.430** 0.713***
Return (17.74) (21.31) (12.84) (3234)
0.693*** -0.610*** 0.355*** 0.655***
(3.05) (3.40) (3.69) (10.35)
0.878*** 0.536* 0.382*** 0.496***
(2.84) (2.19 (2.92) (5.75)
UNID -1.108*** -1.075*** -0.318*** -0.385***(8.49) (10.41) (5.75) (10.56)
Adjusted R' 0.774 0.809 0.658 0.915
n 168 168 168 168
Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 plots the relative performance of
Banks and Other Thrifts (labeled "Thrifts" in the figure) over the
financial crisis. The relatively large return difference is greatly
attenuated, although the one-sided p-value of 0.116 indicates that the
difference is, again, only marginally significant.
99. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%. 5 %, and 1% level, respectively. This
Table provides results from estimations of Model 1 and Model 2:
Model 1: Index Return,- RF,= ±, +p,(Market Return,- RF)+ c,
Model 2: Index Return,- RF,= 13, +,(Market Return,- RF)+f/JSMB+,HML+IUMD~t
Index Return refers to the return of the equal-weighted index for the relevant set of financial
institutions (Charter-Switchers, Reverse-Switchers, Other Thrifts, or Banks). Market Return, RF
(Risk Free Rate), SMB, HML, and UMD are taken from the Fama-French Factors dataset
available on Wharton Research Data Services. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses
below coefficient estimates.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Adjusted Returns for Thrifts and Bankso
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
- Bank - Thrift
Table 3 presents abnormal returns around relevant events,
utilizing the results from Model 2 as a benchmark. After controlling
for risk, the returns experienced by all institutions were insignificantly
different from zero for negative news events. Only Banks experienced
statistically significant abnormal positive returns for the positive or
ambiguous events. However, it seems strange that the recent Charter-
Switchers had such a dramatically different risk profile than Other
Thrifts.
The negative returns for Charter-Switchers are most
concentrated at two events. The first event is the distressed sale of
Countrywide to Bank of America, and the second event is the release
of TALF program details, which coincided with the downgrade of
several large banks by Standard and Poor's. These events seem
particularly relevant with respect to thrift institutions, lending
credence to the potential regulatory effect. The sale of Countrywide
100. This figure charts the cumulative adjusted returns for Banks and Other Thrifts
(labeled "Thrift" in the figure) over the financial crisis period, March to December 2008.
See supra Table 2 and accompanying text (discussing the four-factor model utilized to
adjust returns).
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was a clear indicator of the level of distress in thrifts significantly
involved in subprime lending, and the release of TALF program
details likely did not help thrifts as much as banks due to the high
credit ratings required for asset-backed securities to be eligible for the
program and the initial inapplicability of the program to
collateralized mortgage-backed securities. TALF was designed to
increase liquidity in some securitization markets. As the Federal
Reserve announced in December 2008, "only certain newly issued,
highly rated ABS collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit
card loans, and loans guaranteed by the Small Business
Administration" were initially eligible under the program, and while
thrifts could participate in these markets, their exposure here was
more limited than their exposure to housing markets.101
There is no substantial difference over the positive or ambiguous
news events overall. We do not explore these events in detail because
most provide conflicting news, making predictions difficult ex ante.
Of potential interest, however, is the event window of twelve business
days from September 5, 2008, to September 22, 2008, that yields
positive abnormal returns of 20.5% for the Charter-Switchers and
22.9% for Reverse-Switchers, compared to abnormal returns of 1.4%
for the Other Thrifts and 7.8% for Banks. As numerous events
overlap during this timeframe, we do not explore this finding further
but merely note it.
101. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 19, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081219b.htm.
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Table 3: Cumulative Adjusted Returns Around Significant News
Events"2
run
mar. 14
Mar. 14 0.5%
Countrywide sale to June 4-
Bank of America June 6 4.4% -2.8% 02 -.
Lehman 20 loss of June 13-
$2.8B June 17
IndyMac takeover July 10 3 4.0% 2.1% -3.5% 0.9%July 14
Wash. Mutual
closure; Sept. 24
Citi/Wachovia 5 3.9% 1.2% 0.3% 2.4%
discussions;
Bailout voted down
TALF details
released; Dec. 19- 3 -4.3% -1.3% 1.7% 1.3%Large banks Dec. 23
downgraded
Total negative 2 3.6% -2.1% -1.4% 1.9%
(t-statistic) (0.30) (0.22) (0.30) (0.40)
Bear Sterns price Mar. 20- 3 -. % 06 03 10
mecrease Mar. 25
Freddie/Fannie
takeover; Sp.5
Lehman 12 20. 2.9% 1.4% 7.8%
bankruptcy; Sept. 22
Short sales banned
Wells Fargo
acquires Wachovia; Oct. 2-
House passes Oct. 13
revised plan
102. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. This
Table provides the event date window details from the Federal Reserve timeline, the number of
trading days during the period (per CRSP), and the abnormal returns for equal-weighted
indexes of Charter-Switchers and Other Thrifts based on Model 2 as detailed in Table 2.
Bootstrap p-values are reported below the returns for each event.
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Capital injections
agreed;
FDIC insurance Oct. 14- 4 9.2% 14.2% 5.0% 5.5%
increase; Oct. 17
Tier 1 capital
definition
Total 27 32.2% 32.6% 7.6% 17.3%***
positive/ambiguous 1 (1.43) (1.52) (1.45) (3.37)
Thus far, the results are consistent with Charter-Switchers being
higher risk but experiencing lower adjusted returns during the
subprime crisis. We next examine whether Charter-Switchers differ
from other financial institutions in terms of the bailout funds received
under TARP. To do so, we obtain a list of all financial institutions
that received bailout funds from ProPublica and match this list with
our initial data set for all firms remaining on September 30, 2008,
immediately before the bailout was passed by Congress. We then set
to zero the bailout received for any financial institution that does not
appear on the bailout list.
We estimate the following model to determine whether Charter-
Switchers are different from other institutions with respect to bailout
funds:
Model 3: TARP, = o + ,Size, + 2Thrift, + f3Charter-Switcheri +
f/Reverse-Switcher, + c,
In this model, TARP is the natural logarithm of (one plus bailout
funds to the firm in millions of dollars), and Size is the natural
logarithm of a firm's market value of equity on September 30, 2008.
We log-transform these variables to minimize scale differences
between institutions. Thrift is an indicator variable equal to one for a
thrift institution that is not a Charter-Switcher and equal to zero
otherwise; Charter-Switcher is an indicator variable equal to one if a
firm is a Charter-Switcher (changed its regulator to the OTS) and
equal to zero otherwise; and Reverse-Switcher is an indicator variable
equal to one if the institution changes its regulator from the OTS and
equal to zero otherwise.
We expect the coefficient on Size to be positive because
significant discussion at the time of the bailout involved the idea that
firms bailed out were "too big to fail." We have no expectation with
respect to the Thrift variable because these firms were generally
smaller than Banks, and we do not know if the size effect alone will
be sufficient to predict bailout behavior. We expect the Charter-
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Switcher variable to be negative because these firms were higher risk,
likely making them worse bailout candidates compared to other firms.
Table 4 presents results for this model. As expected, the P,
coefficient (on Size) is positive and highly significant, consistent with
the "too big to fail" theory. The fl2 coefficient (on Thrift) is
statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the fl, coefficient (on Charter-
Switcher) is negative and significant. This is consistent with Charter-
Switchers having a lower likelihood of receiving bailout funds
compared to other institutions. In fact, examining the data reveals
that none of the four remaining Charter-Switchers received any
bailout funds, while roughly forty percent of Banks and thirty percent
of Other Thrifts received funds. 103 Also of interest is the positive and
significant coefficient for Reverse-Switchers, indicating that those
institutions received relatively more TARP funds than would be
predicted by size alone. We acknowledge that, due to the limited
sample size for Charter-Switchers and Reverse-Switchers, these
results should be interpreted with caution, but they may be consistent
with the Treasury Department tiring of charter-switchers and the
OTS in general.
103. The fact that none of the charter-switching institutions received TARP funds
prevents estimation of a Tobit model because there is no variation in positive funds
through which the model could be estimated.
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CONCLUSION
We examined thrift, bank, and bank-to-thrift (charter-switcher)
performance during the financial crisis as a study of the American
policy permitting financial institutions to choose their preferred
regulator. This Article served as a simple test of the OTS, the most
criticized regulator during the crisis, and it served as a way of
evaluating whether choice of charter affected the decision to bail out
particular institutions.
We developed five hypotheses. We found evidence inconsistent
with H1, our hypothesis that financial institutions which changed their
regulator to the OTS during and after the housing bubble performed
badly during the financial crisis, relative to other institutions.
Although our sample was not large, these institutions were risky, but
after controlling for risk, they did not underperform during the crisis.
104. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
This Table provides results from estimation of Model 3:
Model 3: TARP, = fo +PSize, +fiThrift, +f,8Charter-Switcher, +e,
In this model, TARP is the natural logarithm of bailout funds in millions of dollars; Size is
the natural logarithm of firm market value of equity on September 30, 2008; Thrift is an
indicator variable equal to one for a thrift institution that is not a Charter-Switcher and
zero otherwise; Charter-Switcher is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is a Charter-
Switcher (switched to OTS supervision) and zero otherwise, and Reverse-Switcher is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm switched away from the OTS's supervision and
zero otherwise. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient
estimates.
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Table 4: Bailout Fund Receipt"
Intercept -0.496 (1.38)
.z 0.435***
(6.83)
-0.396
(1.26)
Charter- -2.696**
Switcher (2.48)
Reverse- 5.520***
Switcher (3.54)
Adjusted R2 0.148
n 385
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We found marginal support for H2, our hypothesis that thrifts,
institutions generally encouraged by their charter to participate in
home lending, performed badly during the financial crisis. Thrifts had
low historical levels of risk relative to banks, and they had marginally
lower risk-adjusted returns. They were not, however, as risky as
banks-an interesting finding given the exposure of the thrifts to the
housing market. But these results should not be overstated because
thrift performance was not significantly different from that of banks.
Our results from H1 and H2 combine to bring the merits of
permitting charter-shopping by financial institutions into question.
The performance of charter-switching institutions was not, after
controlling for the higher risk of these institutions, significantly worse
than other thrifts. Thus, any relative underperformance of thrifts
appears to be, in general, more due to the business model (e.g., the
QTL test) than to the regulator. However, this conclusion depends
somewhat on the proper view of risk and why the charter-switchers
held the OTS charters when they had significantly higher systematic
risk than other thrifts. Although this could be attributable to the
quality of supervision by the OTS, it could also be attributable to
other factors, such as the smaller size of thrifts relative to banks-a
possibility consistent with the fact that thrifts were permitted to fail
during the crisis (even large ones), while banks were more likely to
receive early TARP money (especially large ones).
We found evidence inconsistent with H3, our hypothesis that
charter-switchers were particularly likely to receive bailouts during
the financial crisis. Although the charter-switchers were of a size that
should have entitled them to bailout money, they did not receive it.
This may indicate that charter-switchers were distinctive, and it may
also indicate that the government, though permitting these
institutions to shop for a regulator, concluded that they were not
entitled to the kind of TARP money that other financial institutions
received. It is possible that the government soured on these
institutions.
We found evidence consistent with H4, our hypothesis that
institutions that switched their charters away from the OTS were
particularly likely to receive bailouts during the financial crisis. It
appears that these institutions received preferential treatment with
respect to TARP funds. Again, however, it must be noted that our
findings with respect to H3 and H4 involve small sample sizes and
should be interpreted with caution.
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We found no evidence supporting H5, our hypothesis that thrifts
were particularly likely to require bailouts during the financial crisis.
Controlling for size, thrifts received bailouts from the government to
the same degree as banks.
Although our study is not definitive, it raises the question as to
why financial institutions should be able to shop for regulators.
Although regulatory competition can, in some circumstances, have
value,os our small sample of thrifts and banks that switched their
charters had high levels of risk for their returns. It is not clear that
charter switching benefitted these shareholders, and those institutions
that switched to thrifts were not bailed out, as the other institutions
were. Our study also represents a small measure of vindication for the
OTS, which oversaw a thrift industry that underperformed banks
marginally-the sort of underperformance that would not seem to
call for the regulatory death penalty.
We close by acknowledging some limitations of our event study,
which draws some of its conclusions from a small number of charter-
switchers, and it is thus limited to an important degree already. But
like most event studies, our results cannot fully capture the social
costs or benefits of the choice of charter regime.'0 Our investigation
of changes in security prices offers some evidence as to the private
implications of the performance of thrifts and banks, but it cannot tell
us everything we would like to know about the larger consequences
of the choice of charter debate. Some of the costs of regulatory
failure, including the costs of the choice to bail out failing institutions
or not, may not be captured by the share prices of the institutions.0 7
105. See Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 12, at 100 (including "the application of
divided government to financial regulation" and incentives "to engage in
experimentation").
106. See Ross L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING
THEORY 3 (1986); Zhang, supra note 91, at 77.
107. Moreover, this Article is subject to some of the inherent limitations of event
studies. See Richard Leftwich, Evidence of the Impact of Mandatory Changes in
Accounting Principles on Corporate Loan Agreements, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 9-10 (1981).
It is difficult, especially over the course of a crisis like that affecting the economy in 2008,
to disentangle all contemporaneous news from that news, incorporated into stock prices,
attributable to the impact of the events we studied here. In addition to the possibility that
the difference is explicable on the basis of unobserved variance, we cannot discount the
possibility that investors expected charter-switchers to perform better than banks or thrifts
during the crisis and were surprised when they did not do so (though these sorts of
alternative hypotheses are an issue in many event studies).
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